UNDER PRESSURE! NUDGING ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION WITHIN FIRMS: FEEDBACK FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT

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Under pressure! Nudging electricity consumption within firms. Feedback from a field experiment*

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Abstract

Many economists and psychologists have studied the impact of nudges on households' pro-environmental behaviors. Interestingly, "private nudges" can be imagined for companies. Yet, studies focusing on nudging employees' energy use are rare. The objective of our paper is to explore this issue with the help of a field experiment conducted at 47 French companies' sites. Using a difference-in-difference methodology, the effects of three nudges on employees' energy conservation are tested. The first nudge, "moral appeal", stresses the responsible use of energy. The second one, "social comparison", informs employees on the energy consumption of other firms participating in the experiment. Finally, the third nudge, "stickers", alerts employees about good energy conservation practices. Our results stress the complementarity of these nudges. When implemented alone, the three nudges have no significant effects on energy consumption. However, when the moral appeal and social comparison nudges are combined with the stickers one, they become effective.

Keywords: Energy demand management, Private nudges, Peer pressure, Field experiment.
JEL Codes: C93, D04, D91, Q41

1 Introduction

The practical difficulties of implementing Pigouvian taxes on energy consumption and the development of behavioral sciences have raised interest for non-price energy conservation policies. Behavioral economics has made major contributions to the development of this literature assuming more realistic individual behaviors than the one usually supposed. In particular for the interest of this paper, agents are supposed to take account of social norms when choosing pro-environmental actions (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Brekke et al., 2003; Nyborg et al., 2006).

Within this field, the use of nudges has been prominent among policy proposals since the pioneering work of Schultz (1999). Nudges can be presented (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) as rules of thumb modifying choice

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architecture to induce individuals to choose a wished course of action. Nudges can consist in choosing the right default option (taking advantage of the inertia generally characterizing individual behavior), delivering information to correct misperceptions, or providing information on what social psychologists call "descriptive norms" and "injunctive norms". Cialdini et al. (1990) define "descriptive norms" as specifying what most others do ("the *is*"), and "injunctive norms" as specifying what most others approve or disapprove of ("the *ought*"). Nudges based on the former exploit the property that individuals tend to behave in accordance with behavioral norms, whereas a nudge based on the latter uses the weight of moral motive in individual decisions.[1]

Several experiments have already been conducted at varying scales testing nudges on energy consumption and have generally focused on households' electricity consumption in residential sites (Allcott, 2011; Ayres et al., 2013; Houde et al., 2013; Sudarshan, 2017; Kendel et al., 2017). Their results illuminated behavioral strategies to increase energy conservation (Asensio and Delmas, 2015). Allcott (2011), for example, showed that the effect of a social comparison nudge used by the company Opower in a very large randomized field experiment with households, was equivalent to a 11 to 20% short-run price increase. Allcott and Roger (2014) focused on the persistence of the effects of Opower's program. They showed that the marginal effect of the program decreases because of habituation, but that long-term effects should not be underestimated because of the formation of a "capital stock" of habits and technologies facilitating energy economies.

Nudging behavior has also been considered within firms, although this type of study is less common. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) surveyed a number of "private nudges" of this type. Egebark and Ekstrom (2016) conducted a field experiment in a Swedish public university comparing two types of nudges on the saving of paper by employees when printing. The first one took the form of a "green default option" to print on both sides of a sheet of paper (rather than one side). The second one was a "moral appeal" nudge consisting in sending messages to employees trying to convince them to reduce their use of paper. The authors found that the first nudge reduced the consumption of paper by 15%, whereas the second one had no effect. The results of a large-scale field experiment on fuel usage in aeronautics are presented by Gosnell et al. (2016). To induce captains to improve fuel consumption efficiency, they explore three treatments delivering information on: recent individualized fuel efficiency ("information" treatment); the achievement of specific efficiency targets ("personal targets" treatment); and donation to a chosen charity conditional on achieving the efficiency targets("pro-social incentives" treatment). Distinguishing three phases of fuel consumption during a flight, they show that the captains use fuel differently for each treatment. The pro-social incentives is the only treatment that has significant effects on the three fuel consumption phases. To recapitulate this narrow field of literature relating to nudging workplace energy saving, we can argue that: the default option treatment is likely to operate well; moral treatment and pro-social incentives have mixed results; and social comparison treatment, widely used to address households' energy saving, has not been explored yet.

The field experiment we explore in this paper contributes to this literature by considering employees' energy consumption. Compared to experiments with households, experiments involving employees' energy consumption are original for several reasons. First, employees have no financial incentives to reduce their energy consumption, contrary to households who pay the bill, except if a part of their income is indexed to the firm's profit.[2] Even in this case, the pecuniary motive of energy usage may be assumed to be small. Second, an employee's peers are his coworkers. They can share environmental values, especially when the firm has a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policy or has received an environmental certification. The pride or guilt a worker can feel because of the amount (or lack) of his energy saving are thus directly linked to the pressure of his peers.[3] This form of individual interaction might be facilitated by the fact that within a firm the "energy consumption place" is common to workers, so that observing each other is possible. Therefore, individual energy saving actions may

[1] See Schultz et al. (2007) for the combination of the two norms.

[2] Delmas and Lessem (2014) study a comparable situation, nudging electricity consumption of students who do not pay the electricity bills in residence halls.

[3] In this context, studying energy consumption in the workplace, Handgraaf et al. (2013) observed the superiority of public rewards over private ones as well as the superiority of social rewards over monetary ones.

result from peer pressure conveyed by descriptive and social norms.[4] Finally, from a quite pragmatic point of view, an important part of the energy consumption takes place at workplace. For example, in our field experiment we focus on electricity consumption of companies in the French services sector, which accounts for 75% of the country's labor force. In 2013, 45% of the total consumption of electricity was attributable to the combined residential/service sector market sector.[5] The service sector alone had a heated surface of 957 million m^2 and mean annual consumption of 240 kWh/m^2.[6] Offices (i.e. the surfaces of interest in our study) represent 23% of this total heated surface. These data show the important role played by offices in applying behavioral strategies to reduce electricity consumption.

We observe the electricity consumption of 47 company sites during 12 weeks. Our measures distinguish between electricity consumption for heating and electricity consumption for other purposes. The field experiment explores the extent to which three different nudges affect workers electricity consumption. The first treatment provides information on good practices on energy consumption with the help of stickers. The second treatment consists in weekly reports comparing the electricity consumption of the site with the consumption of the other sites participating in the experiment. Finally the third treatment delivers weekly messages linking electricity consumption to the natural and human consequences of global warming. These treatments are experimented alone during four weeks. The latter two treatments, which make use of descriptive and injunctive norms respectively, are coupled with the stickers during the four remaining weeks. This enables us to focus more specifically on the complementarity of two different environmental nudges.

Employing more than 3700 observations, our difference-in-difference analysis suggests that private environmental nudges have no significant impact on workers' energy conservation when implemented alone, but become significant as soon as they are combined with the use of another nudge. In particular, the combination of injunctive norms and stickers has significant effects on electricity consumption on company sites participating in the experiment. To our knowledge, the adoption of conservative electricity behaviors within firms has rarely been studied. By investigating this issue, our study has important implications for "green" business strategies, indicating how a manager can use nudges to encourage employees to engage in responsible energy consumption.

The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the experimental design of our field experiment and describes the nudges used. We present our results in Sections 3 and discuss them in Section 4.

2 Experimental design

2.1 Design and procedures

We conducted a field experiment at 47 French companies' sites. This experiment aimed at measuring the effect of three energy saving programs. The field experiment sought to establish whether three types of nudges: stickers, moral appeal, and social comparison (the independent variables) would successfully decrease the level of energy consumption (the dependent variable). All participating companies were equipped with a Building Management System (BMS), thereby allowing us to obtain the daily energy consumption of individual equipment such as ventilation, lighting, power systems, heating, etc. Companies had neither labor contracts with specific clauses about employees' use of electricity, nor any mechanism of control. We also asked companies not to implement any parallel actions during the field experiment aimed at encouraging energy conservation behavior among

[4]Peer pressure has been considered initially in labor economics (Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Barron and Gjerde, 1997; Mas and Moretti, 2009; Cornelissen et al., 2017) from both theoretical and empirical points of view. This literature explores the impact of peer pressure on productivity or income. From a theoretical perspective, these articles explore how peer pressure can complement pecuniary incentives to counter free-riding when employees' efforts are not observable (or when individual output is not contractible). The empirical findings confirmed that peer pressure should not be disregarded.

[5]`http://www.statistiques.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/indicateurs-indices/f/2090/0/consommation-finale-denergie-secteur.html`

[6]http://www.energie.sia-partners.com/20161102/amelioration-de-lefficacite-energetique-du-parc-tertiaire-quels-leviers-reglementaires-et$_f$tnref1

employees. A profit-sharing arrangement was implemented for employees on 37 sites. This arrangement links individual salaries to any cost saving. However, the impact of individual electricity conservation on remuneration can be considered as very small as well as the resulting financial incentives.[7]

Table 1: Group composition (by treatment)

Treatment	Number of companies
Comparison group	13
MAT 'Moral appeal treatment'	11
SCT 'Social comparison treatment'	11
ST 'Stickers treatment'	12

Each of the 47 companies was randomly assigned to either one of the three treatment groups (N = 11 or 12 for each group) or the comparison group (N = 13). Table 1 outlines the total number of companies within each group. All of the companies in the experiment are service companies. All employees work mainly on computers, have a collective rest area with a coffee maker, kettle, fridge, etc. A series of characteristics distinguishes them, i.e. area, number of employees and location (see table 2).

Table 2: Companies characteristics by treatment

Treatment	Average area in m2	Average of employees	Average of employees per m2	Average of m2 per employees
Comparison group	258	8	0.03125	38.18
MAT 'Moral appeal treatment'	782	23	0.04828	33.12
SCT 'Social comparison treatment'	244	14	0.06610	31.12
ST 'Stickers treatment'	777	38	0.04222	34.58

Figure 1: Experimental design



The experiment was carried out in three stages over 12 weeks (see Figure 1). The first stage was the pre-treatment, which lasted 4 weeks. The information collected during this period was important to understanding

[7]Nevertheless, the 37 sites in our sample are the same as those open to the public. We could not test the effect of profit-sharing as a consequence.

the energy consumption behavior of employees. This first stage also gave us a baseline. The second stage (Phase 1 of treatment) lasted 4 weeks and consisted in applying the different nudges (one per group) to the three treated groups. This phase allowed us to measure the effect of programs on the use of electricity by employees. During the last phase of 4 weeks (Phase 2 of treatment), all treated-groups were subject to the "visual prompt/stickers" program. This phase enabled us to measure the potential complementarity of the different nudges, in particular, the net impact of stickers with respect to the other nudges. These programs started for each sub-group of companies at different pre-defined periods. The phased implementation of programs within each group means that our experiment was a controlled case study.

The assessment of these nudges is made with regard to the economic characteristics of the employees identified in an *ex-ante* analysis (see in Appendix C.1). The latter also allows us characterizing the behavior of the employees studied. Finally, an *ex-post* survey (see in Appendix C.2) allows us verifying whether employees feel that they have been able to modify their behavior and, above all, to compare this estimate with the actual data observed.[8]

2.2 The treatments

2.2.1 Moral Appeal

The first treatment, *moral appeal* (MAT), consisted of sending messages by email encouraging employees to adopt environmentally friendly behavior by reducing energy consumption. This nudge was tested in a field experiment on printing using duplex copiers at a university in Sweden (Egebark and Ekstrom, 2016).

Table 3 lists all the messages that were sent. Each message was sent to the employees by the directors of each company participating in the experiment. During the second phase of treatment (weeks 9 to 12), this message was coupled with stickers (see next sub-section). Moral messages were illustrated (see Annexes B.1 and B.2).

[8]To guarantee individual anonymity, the two surveys indicate the treatment assigned to individual employees without specifying the identity of their companies. As a consequence, no interaction variable between companies and employees could be considered in the econometric analysis.

Table 3: Moral appeal text message

Week	Moral appeal message
5	Through our energy consumption, we contribute to global warming. **2016, record melting of arctic sea ice.** Be involved for change.
6	Through our energy consumption, we contribute to global warming. **One person moves every second for climatic reasons.** Be involved for change.
7	Through our energy consumption, we contribute to global warming. **The oceans will see "their acidity increase by about 170% compared to pre-industrial levels by 2100." Great coral reefs under threat!** Be involved for change.
8	Through our energy consumption, we contribute to global warming. **Between 2030 and 2050, it is expected that climate change will cause more than 250,000 additional deaths per year.** Be involved for change.
9	Through our energy consumption, we contribute to global warming. **Global warming decreases rainfall in the most arid regions and increases it in the most watered regions.** Be involved for change.
10	Through our energy consumption, we contribute to global warming. **Rise of the oceans: The pace is accelerating dangerously.** Be involved for change.
11	Through our energy consumption, we contribute to global warming. **Climate change threatens world food security.** Be involved for change.
12	Through our energy consumption, we contribute to global warming. **Ongoing climate change could cause the extinction of a sixth of all animal species.** Be involved for change.

2.2.2 Social comparison

The second treatment, *social comparison* (SCT), which was in the same vein as the study of Schultz et al. (2007), provided employees information on the overall energy consumption of their company compared to the consumption of other companies participating in the field experiment.[9] This information was delivered with graphics as shown in Appendix B.3.

2.2.3 Stickers (Visual prompt)

Finally, the third treatment, stickers (ST), was based on visual messages that, in a playful way, provided information on several everyday actions that might reduce the individual and overall energy consumption of the company. For example, there was a sticker on the office thermostat indicating the recommended temperature level and explaining that reducing the temperature of each room of 1°C causes a decrease in individual energy consumption by 7%. We combined this kind of nudge with several gestures of everyday life. The 12 "good practices" communicated by the stickers are listed in Table 4. All the stickers used are presented in Appendix B.4.

[9]The methodology used to compare energy consumption is explained in Appendix A.

Table 4: Stickers

	Sticker messages	**Sticker positions**
1	Reducing the temperature of each room of 1°C causes a decrease in individual energy consumption by 7%. Wearing a sweater guarantees just as much comfort.	Placed near the thermostats.
2	Opening a window, even for a few minutes to ventilate a room, for example, must be accompanied by a heating cut-off so as not to waste energy during the opening period.	Placed next to the windows.
3	Anticipation of the end-of-day heating cut: The inertia of buildings is generally sufficient to switch off the heating 1 to 2 hours before departure.	Placed either beside thermostats or heaters.
4	Standby at noon and turn off at night.	Placed on the computer screen or close to the computer
5	If the laptop battery is sufficiently charged, no need to connect the device. Connect the notebook only if the battery is low.	Placed next to the visible sockets commonly used to connect a laptop
6	Print only when necessary.	Placed on the printer.
7	Switch off equipment in case of absence and at the end of the day.	Placed on or near the printer or photocopier.
8	Do not leave a loaded device connected and do not leave a charger plugged into the socket because it consumes as long as it is plugged in.	Placed either near a plug, close to the office, or in the vicinity of a plug used to recharge phones or other devices.
9	Turn off lights in unoccupied rooms and in case of prolonged absence.	Placed close to light switches.
10	Do not use your desk lamp when daylight illuminates the room in which you work.	Placed near the desk lamps.
11	Be careful not to leave coffee makers switched on when not in use.	Placed on coffee makers.
12	Reheat only the amount of water you need.	Placed on kettles.

3 Results

3.1 *Ex ante* survey information

The survey distributed to employees before the implementation of the different nudges during the pretreatment period (see Figure 1) shed light on three different aspects: first, the importance attached to the environment in connection with energy consumption by employees; second, the adoption of energy conservation actions at home and work; and finally, employees' positions regarding the information delivered by the different nudges used in the field experiment.

On the first point, the survey's results show that an overwhelming majority of employees claim to attach importance to environmental preservation and think that energy conservation is directly linked to it. The evident attention paid to energy conservation measures in everyday life does not contradict this first observation.

Regarding the second point, simple actions such as switching off the light when leaving a room and those involving lowering costs like taking care of the energy consumption of lighting and appliances, are found to be the most adopted. More constraining or more expensive actions are less frequently adopted. Interestingly, a difference between the attention paid to electricity consumption at home and work is reported: 95% of the workers who answered the survey declared that they paid attention to their consumption at home compared to 89% at work. The gap may be explained by several reasons: the ease with which the control of electricity con-

sumption can be done at home and at work, the diversion of employees' attention, different financial incentives, etc. Regarding incentives, 79% of the respondents considered that indexing their salaries to their electricity consumption would incite them to reduce consumption. However, 64% of them are currently in that situation thanks to a profit-sharing arrangement. This difference can be explained by the fact that managing electricity consumption can only have a marginal effect on the profit or due to ignorance of the exact way remuneration is calculated within the firm.

On the third point, the *ex ante* survey provides us with insight about employees' opinions regarding the importance of the information delivered by the three nudges tested in the experiment. For instance, more information on the consequences of energy consumption on the environment was seen by 70% of the respondents as an element that would have a positive impact on their electricity consumption. The "moral appeal" nudge delivering such information should therefore be effective. In the same way, the information on everyday energy conservation gestures given by the "stickers" nudge was positively evaluated by 66% of the respondents. The information delivered by the "social comparison" nudge received 70% positive feedback. In view of these scores, the different nudges tested should impact employees' electricity consumption. The rest of the paper specifically addresses this question.

3.2 Descriptive statistics:

3.2.1 Main variables

The different statistics provided and the following econometric analysis consider electricity consumption by isolating heating ('heating') from the rest of the electricity consumption ('electricity'). Table 5 summarizes the general statistical characteristics of the main variables in our analysis during the 12 weeks of the experiment. We see that the average of electricity consumption is equal to 157.58 KWhr, and the average for electricity consumption for heating is equal to 54.26 KWhr. In our experiment, the outdoor temperature varied from approximately 0 to 21$°C$.

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics on the experiment period

Variable	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Site surface (m^2)	475.76	730.39	46	4812	4536
Nb Employees	18.65	28.19	1	120	4536
Electricity consumption, (kWhr)	157.58	191.06	3	2024	4536
Heating consumption, (kWhr)	54.26	64.28	0.22	506	3696
Weather temperature, ($°C$)	12.98	3.19	0.32	21.13	4536

Tables 6 and 7 summarize the descriptive statistics of both electricity and heating consumption during the pre-treatment period. Global consumption, consumption per employee, and consumption per m^2 are presented separately. Note that the standard deviations of the global electricity consumption and of the global heating consumption are higher than the mean values. This is explained by outlier values. However, these extremes values are due to the heterogeneity of the companies regarding the office area and the number of employees. A small number of big sites has a very high electricity consumption. As soon as we consider consumption per m^2 or consumption per employee the standard deviations are smaller than the means (Tables 6 and 7) except in one case (for Heating per employee with stickers).[10]

[10] As we control for the office area and the number of employees in our regression, the outlier values do not affect our estimation results.

Table 6: Statistics on electricity consumption on pre-treatment period

		Electricity consumption, kWhr					
		Global		Per employees		Per m2	
Treatment	**Nb. Obs.**	**Mean**	**Std.Dev.**	**Mean**	**Std.Dev.**	**Mean**	**Std.Dev.**
Comparison group	364	122.4839	105.6071	18.4242	8.220498	0.5438	0.2774
MAT 'Moral appeal treatment'	308	277.6154	427.7756	14.89221	11.28356	0.4016	0.2954
SCT 'Social comparison treatment'	336	241.8651	104.457	15.4202	11.78481	0.4603	0.2569
ST 'Stickers treatment'	308	137.9481	84.61026	18.47716	16.79565	0.6362	0.4336

Table 7: Statistics on heating consumption on pre-treatment period

		Heating consumption, kWhr					
		Global		Per employees		Per m2	
Treatment	**Nb. Obs**	**Mean**	**Std.Dev**	**Mean**	**Std.Dev**	**Mean**	**Std.Dev**
Comparison group	364	62.31899	58.89126	8.177	4.6357	0.2348257	0.1439819
MAT 'Moral appeal treatment'	224	127.9435	128.5898	8.31	7.1165	0.1904527	0.1333283
SCT 'Social comparison treatment'	224	80.5084	41.56494	7.5533	4.4759	0.2341358	0.1408752
ST 'Stickers treatment'	224	55.13296	53.19073	9.1058	11.0337	0.2343678	0.2030048

3.2.2 Evolution of the Electricity and Heating consumption during the experimental period



Figure 2: Mean daily Electricity and Heating consumption

Figure 2 shows the average daily electricity and heating consumption in the four treatments. We observe that the average consumption in all treatments decreased. The trends observed for electricity and heating seem to be similar. These decreasing trends can be explained by an increasing temperature over the period (cf. Figure 3) and an increase in the hours of sunlight. The troughs in consumption appearing regularly correspond to Sundays. We note that even on these non-working days, consumption of electricity and heating is positive. Differences emerge in consumption between groups. However, when consumption per m^2 or consumption per employee are considered, such differences disappear (see. figure 10 in Appendix E).

The weekly electricity and heating consumption are shown in Figure 4 and contains additional information. Regarding the evolution of electricity consumption in the pre-treatment period (the four first weeks), we can observe a little increase between the first and second week and a decrease thereafter. The treatment period (between week 4 and week 12) exhibits differences between treatments, except for the comparison group and the stickers group (the electricity consumptions move in parallel under these treatments). This suggests that stickers have no effect on the consumption of electricity. The electricity consumption for the social comparison treatment and the comparison group seem to progress in parallel during the first period of treatment (between



Figure 3: Daily Mean of weather temperature, $°C$

week 4 and week 8). However, this similarity is less clear during the second part of the treatment (between week 8 and week 12). Therefore, the data suggest a treatment effect in the second treatment period only. The moral appeal treatment fluctuates the most, which seems to suggest that this treatment has an impact on electricity consumption. Regarding heating consumption, the pre-treatment period exhibits similar fluctuations across the four groups. Stickers seem to have no influence, whereas consumption under the social comparison and moral appeal treatments appears to decrease more than what is observed in the comparison group.



Figure 4: Mean of Electricity and Heating consumption by week

To complete this graphical analysis, we proceed to the Kruskal–Wallis equality-of-populations rank test[11], considering the average of the observations. As indicated in Table 8, we reject the null hypothesis that the consumption is the same for all treatments (p=0.001) except concerning heating between the comparison group and stickers-treated groups (p=0.5734).

[11]The Kruskal-Wallis test is a non-parametric test of the hypothesis that several samples come from the same population. The null hypothesis is the equality of all groups' medians. The alternative hypothesis is that at least the median of one group is different from the median of at least another group.

Table 8: Kruskal–Wallis test by treatment

Treatment	Electricity consumption	Heating consumption
Moral Appeal (MAT)	$X^2(2) = 82.472$ p = 0.001	$X^2(2) = 246.912$ p = 0.001
Social Comparison (SCT)	$X^2(2) = 1085.574$ p = 0.001	$X^2(2) = 256.795$ p = 0.001
Stickers (ST)	$X^2(2) = 109.772$ p = 0.001	$X^2(2) = 0.317$ p = 0.5734

3.3 Econometric analysis

To go further in our analysis, we proceed to an econometric analysis. We use panel data for the electricity and heating consumption of companies over 12 weeks (84 days). In order to estimate the impact of the nudges used in the field experiment on employees' energy consumption, we compare the performance of a sample of companies pre- and post-treatment relative to the performance of the comparison group at the same instant in time. Companies whose employees' electricity consumption is nudged in the treatment period represent the treated group (either MAT, SCT, or ST), while the non-treated companies in the sample form the comparison group (T0). In essence, variation in energy consumptions is explained across time and groups.

A difference-in-difference (DID) analysis is developed, which controls for external factors affecting both the sample and the comparison group between periods. The evolution in average consumption for non-treated companies over the same period represents the counterfactual, i.e. the evolution in energy consumption not observed for the treated but that would had been observed in the absence of the nudge. For difference-in-differences to provide an unbiased consistent estimate of the treatment effect, the treatment group and the comparison group must follow the same trend over time in the absence of treatment (parallel trends assumption).[12] We test the assumption of parallel trends using the fully flexible model for parallel paths developed by Mora and Reggio (2019).[13] We find that our sample fulfills this identifying assumption. This methodology requires data measured in at least two time periods so as to estimate the expected difference in the outcome variable between the treated and comparison groups. This means that even if the treated group had not been subjected to a nudge, this difference between the groups would still exist. This methodology is chosen to control time trend factors such as changes in weather temperature, socioeconomic characteristics over time, as well as behavioral factors directly or indirectly affecting energy consumption. These factors are assumed to affect both groups in the same way. This method reduces both the potential selection and temporal bias between treated and comparison groups (Wooldridge, 2007).

We present the following equation for the difference-in-difference estimation:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{it} &= \beta_1 T_{it} \\ &+ \beta_2 A_{it} + \beta_3 T_{it} A_{it} \\ &+ \beta_4 B_{it} + \beta_5 T_{it} B_{it} \\ &+ \beta_6 DaysWorked + \beta_7 WeatherTemperature \\ &+ \beta_8 CompanySize + \beta_9 NbEmployees + \beta_{10} AgencyOpenPublic \\ &+ \beta_0 + \epsilon_{it}. \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

Here, Y_{it} is the outcome variable of interest, i.e. the average daily energy consumption for company i at time t. T_{it} equals 1 if company i belongs to the group of companies treated (and 0 otherwise), and thus, β_1 captures

[12] In Figure 4 we can observe similar trends for the different groups prior the treatment. This indicates that the assumption is valid and that the DID approach can be used.

[13] Results are available upon request.

the differences between the companies treated and those of the comparison group before the nudge treatment. A_{it} equals 1 in the first treatment period (from Week 5 to Week 8). Therefore, β_2 captures aggregated factors that would cause changes in energy use in the absence of treatment. The interaction term β_3 is the coefficient of interest for the first treatment period (from Week 5 to Week 8 in Fig. 1) and equals 1 for companies treated by the first nudge after the intervention (and 0 otherwise). It represents the causal effect of treatment, i.e. the impact of the first nudge on energy consumption. B_{it} equals 1 in the second treatment period (from Week 9 to Week 12). Therefore, β_4 captures aggregated factors that would cause changes in energy use in the absence of this second part of treatment. The interaction term β_5 is the coefficient of interest and equals 1 for companies treated by the combination of two different nudges (and 0 otherwise). It represents the causal effect of treatment, i.e. the impact of the combination of two nudges on energy consumption. The full set statistical controls for observable characteristics include weather temperature,[14] number of employees, days worked (equal to 1 if it is a work day for the company, 0 otherwise), company surface area, and whether it is an agency[15] open to the public. β_0 is the constant terme, ϵ_{it} is a random, unobserved term which contains the error caused by omitted covariates

The results of the DID regression for the changes in energy consumptions are reported in Table 9. Our results are robust to various estimation strategies and specifications (Available in Appendix D, Table 11: the DID estimation by treatment with company-fixed effects, and Table 12: the DID estimation for all treatments with company-fixed effects).

Table 9: Difference-in-differences estimation results by treatment

	Moral Appeal (MAT)		**Social comparison (SCT)**		**Stickers (ST)**	
	Electricity consumption	Heating consumption	Electricity consumption	Heating consumption	Electricity consumption	Heating consumption
First treatment period - 29 to 56 days (A_{it})	-11.879**	-8.689**	-16.686**	-20.080***	-25.507***	-14.768***
Second treatment period - 57 to 84 days (B_{it})	-13.917*	-8.021*	-125.255***	-34.891***	-46.062***	-22.362***
Companies treated (T_{it})	84.546***	23.006***	63.126***	-0.541	26.109***	-3.783
First treatment period * companies treated ($A_{it} * T_{it}$)	-7.278	-7.937	-4.087	2.676	4.916	1.442
Second treatment period * companies treated ($B_{it} * T_{it}$)	-44.666***	-20.432**	-20.114*	-7.196	7.238	1.297
Days Worked	35.817***	17.588***	37.332***	7.247***	38.749***	21.694***
Weather temperature	-4.974***	-5.549***	-2.350***	0.671	2.466***	-2.229***
Company size (area)	-0.151***	0.006	0.074***	0.081***	0.1197***	0.085***
Nb Employees	17.039***	2.339***	1.376***	2.549***	3.121***	2.916***
Agency open to the public	447.631***		90.632***		121.04***	
Constant	-384.927***	92.277***	2.166	113.811***	-107.457***	27.849***
R^2	0.8574	0.6921	0.4894	0.4580	0.3224	0.4705
N	2016	1764	2100	1764	2016	1764

$* : p < 0.05, ** : p < 0.01, *** : p < 0.001$. Robusted standard errors

First of all, we note that for the third treatment, the consumption of electricity and heating is generally significantly positively affected by the days worked and significantly negatively affected by the weather temperature. These results are not surprising. We also introduce characteristic variables for companies (company surface, number of employees, agency open to the public).[16] The use of heating and electricity is more important during days worked (computer, light, heating off or on standby mode). Similarly, if the outdoor temperature is higher, the internal temperature (and brightness) will be improved, which can reduce the consumption of heating (and electricity). The interaction variable 'First period of treatment * Treated', representing the effect of the measure during the first part of the treatment, is not significant for any of the three treatments. This means that it does not affect electricity or heating consumption. Regarding the moral appeal treatment, we observe that the time of experiment (first and second period of treatment) significantly affect the consumption. As a consequence, a temporal effect is in play. Another interesting result concerns the interaction variable 'Second

[14] Weather temperature is used as a proxy for exogenous climatic conditions such as sun radiation.

[15] We expect that agencies open to the public have higher comfort standards, thereby implying more electricity consumption.

[16] The variable "Agency open to the public" is a binary variable. Thus the positive significance of this variable can be explained by the fact that a company that receives customers must respect some comfort.

period of treatment * Treated', which represents the effect of the combination between two treatments during the second part of the experiment. We observe that this variable negatively impacts electricity and heating consumption. The moral appeal treatment alone does not significantly impact the consumption of electricity and heating (even if it goes in the right direction). However, when it is coupled with the stickers-treatment, which provides information on good practices to manage electricity consumption, it then becomes effective. In other words, complementarity between the moral and stickers treatments seems to exist.

We observe the same trend for electricity consumption in the social comparison treatment: this treatment alone does not affect the consumption, but when it is coupled with the stickers treatment, it negatively affects the energy consumption. Finally, the stickers treatment alone does not affect energy consumption. Moreover, we can rank the effects of our treatments. Indeed the complementarity 'social comparison + stickers' is less effective than 'moral appeal + stickers'. When we applied the moral appeal treatment, the consumption of electricity decreased by 44,660 KWhr with a concomitant decrease in heating of 20,495 KWhr, while the corresponding decreases for the social comparison treatment were 20,631 KWhr for electricity and 7,358 KWhr for heating.

To know if "moral appeal" and "social comparison" treatments have an effect before the second part of the experiment (Weeks 9–12), and to see whether the effect of our treatments becomes more significant over time, we also perform difference-in-difference calculations per week. The results of the coefficients of interest of these interaction variables are represented in Figure 5 (see Appendix F).



Figure 5: Effect of Moral Appeal and Social Comparison treatments on Electricity and Heating consumption by week

Regarding electricity and heating consumption for the "moral appeal" treatment, the graphs in Figure 5 show that the effect of treatment is significant only from the 10th week. Concerning the social comparison

treatment, the graphs confirm the difference-in-difference results presented in Table 9: no effect for heating and a significant effect for electricity that appears from the 11th week. Moral appeal and social comparison therefore seem to take longer to impact behavior.

Regarding the global effect of the 'social comparison' treatment, we can test the effect of the quality of each message (see Table 10), given that we communicated four message levels (very positive, positive, negative, very negative) to the social comparison treated-group.[17] The idea is to test whether employees respond better to the descriptive norm in situations of praise (Handgraaf et al., 2013). The effect of these messages is different on heating and electricity consumption. We observe that only 'very positive' and 'positive' messages impact energy consumption. However, their respective effects are diametrically opposed: a 'very positive' message positively impacts heating consumption (i.e. increases it),[18] while a 'positive' message induces a decrease in electricity consumption.

Table 10: Effect of messaging on consumption

	Social comparison (SCT)	
	Electricity consumption	Heating consumption
First treatment period (29-56 days)	-16.608***	-20.169***
Companies treated	62.705***	-4.25
First treatment period * Companies treated * Very Positive Message	2.709	36.816***
First treatment period * Companies treated * Positive Message	-50.617***	-8.593
First treatment period * Companies treated * Negative Message	12.918	-10.328
First treatment period * Companies treated * Very Negative Message	25.892	6.433
Company size (Area)	0.086***	0.119***
Nb Employees	1.649***	2.346***
Days Worked	40.171***	7.073**
Weather temperature	-2.393***	0.719*
Agency open to the public	134.419***	
Constant	-48.246	1.138
R-squared	0.4823	0.4911
N	1400	1176

$* : p < 0.05, ** : p < 0.01, *** : p < 0.001$. Robusted standard errors

The energy savings achieved during the field experiment concern only a small sample of companies in the service sector. The "moral appeal" treatment combined with stickers during one month allowed savings of 44.7 KWhr for heating and 20.6 KWhr for electricity. Extrapolations to the entire French service sector on a larger period of one year can be done to better grasp the consequences of this nudge. In 2013 in France, offices represented 23% of the total heated surfaces of the combined residential/service sector market, or 220 million heated m^2.[19] Half of the employees of the service sector, or 10 million people, work in this sub-sector.[20] Taking account of the heating period and an attenuating effect at the beginning and at the end of this period, we can thus estimate what would be the effect of the "moral appeal" treatment on heating consumption for the entire sector during a year. We can perform the same type of estimations for the annual electricity consumption for uses other than heating, taking account of 4 weeks off on average. Using the data for the office sector in France, the moral appeal treatment would lead to a potential annual energy savings of 7453 MWhr for heating and 9840 MWhr for electricity consumption. These total estimated electricity savings of 17.3 GWhr represent the average electricity consumption of 3600 French households.[21] Another way to illustrate the potential annual

[17] A very positive message is "Last week you were the most efficient site participating in our experiment". A positive message is "Last week you consumed less than 62.5% of the sites (...)". A negative message is "(...) you consumed more than 56.25% of (...)". A very negative message is "(...) you consumed more than 87.5% of (...)". See Appendix B.3.

[18] A 'boomerang effect' may be at work here. As explained by Schultz et al. (2007), a descriptive norm allows people to measure the gap between their behavior and the norm. This gap can be positive or negative. In the latter case, the descriptive norm may push up energy consumption.

[19] `http://www.energie.sia-partners.com/20161102/amelioration-de-lefficacite-energetique-du-parc-tertiaire-quels-leviers-reglem`
`_ftnref1`.

[20] `https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/1906677?sommaire=1906743`.

[21] The average consumption for a French household is 4710 KWhr. See source `https://prix-elec.com/energie/comprendre/`

energy savings of the moral appeal treatment is to consider the electricity required for a particular use. The potential energy savings of 17.3 GWhr represents, for instance, the electricity needed for domestic hot water for a town of 21,500 inhabitants (the average electricity consumption per inhabitant is 880 KWhr per year).

4 Conclusions

How can managers nudge electricity consumption of employees in an agency relationship so as to align employees' effort to their cost minimization objective? This paper deals with this question from an empirical point of view.

Our experimental results show interesting information regarding the three different nudges we used (information delivery, social comparison, and moral appeal). When implemented alone, the three different treatments have no significant effects. In other words, the three nudges do not significantly affect energy and heating consumption. More precisely, moral appeal treatment negatively affects electricity and heating consumptions, as does social comparison treatment for electricity only, although these effects are not significant. This result is in line with the information delivered by the *ex post* survey we did once the experiment ended. For example, of those respondents who followed the Internet links provided in company emails to obtain more information, 85% read the messages communicated with the "moral appeal" nudge, 72% considered them as non-intrusive, and 60% had their curiosity aroused. However, only 28% of them thought that these messages had any real effect on their electricity consumption. The same kind of figures hold for the other nudges: 98% of the respondents read the messages on social comparison, but only 36% estimate that it has changed their electricity consumption. Furthermore, 90% of the respondents noticed the stickers, but only 16% only estimated that they changed their electricity consumption as a result.

However, things are not so straightforward. When the moral appeal and social comparison treatments were combined with the stickers, they became effective. Moral appeal treatment combined with stickers has a significant negative effect on both electricity and heating consumptions, while the combination of social comparison treatment with stickers has a significant negative effect on electricity consumption only. Therefore, complementarity of these two nudges with the stickers may exist. We think that the moral appeal and social comparison nudges act more as means of creating awareness, while the stickers more likely act as a "reminder" of everyday actions for proper energy conservation. Indeed, the first two nudges raise individuals' awareness but do not necessarily give the means or the knowledge necessary to act and improve energy conservation. Regarding this comment, it is interesting to note that the *ex post* survey reveals that when coupled with stickers during Phase 2 of the treatment, 47% of the surveyed employees confronted with the moral appeal nudge and 32% of those subjected to the social comparison nudge estimated that stickers affected their electricity consumption. The importance attached to the moral appeal and social comparison nudges is therefore stronger when coupled with stickers. However, this is only one possible explanation for the significant effect of the two treatments in the second period. Another explanation could be a simple temporal effect. Nevertheless, the difference-in-difference calculations per week presented encourage us to favor the hypothesis of complementary treatments rather than that of a temporal effect. Finally, regardless of the phase of treatment during the experiment, peer pressure is revealed to be a factor by the *ex post* survey. When respondents were asked if the change in behavior of their colleagues they observed following the nudge positively influences their own electricity consumption, they were systematically more likely to answer in the affirmative when they had talked about the nudge with their colleagues. For example, 28% of the employees surveyed confronted with the moral appeal nudge declared that they had changed their electricity consumption as a consequence of the treatment. However, 40% of those who talked about this treatment with colleagues estimated that a change in their colleagues? behavior affected their own electricity consumption.

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Appendix A

Methodology used to compare energy consumptions in the "social comparison" treatment

To be able to quantify and compare the potential gains in terms of energy consumption caused by the nudges tested in our field experiment, it is necessary to normalize the different consumptions taking account of comparable units between the tested sites. In this context, two different indicators are used for heating and electricity (heating excepted) consumption. The consumption of electricity due to heating is weighted by the heated surface of the building. The calculation of this consumption is normalized per unified degree days during the period of observation. The unified degree days represent the temperature difference between a norm (of 22 $°C$ for office buildings) and the exterior temperature. Therefore, for each building, unified degree days express the required electricity consumption to reach the norm. The "social comparison" treatment uses these relative electricity consumptions for heating in relation to the unified degree days per square meter. The ranking of the different sites is made taking account of the variations of these relative consumptions each week. Regarding the electricity consumption for uses other than heating, the calculation is weighted by the number of employees working on the tested site. In a similar manner to what we do for heating, for the "social comparison" treatment, we calculate the variations of electricity consumption observed each week weighted by employees and rank the different sites according to these observations. This method permits energy consumptions, which are constant over time and over which employees have no control (such as the electricity consumed because of a server room, for example), to be neutralized.

Appendix B

B.1. Moral Appeal

Figure 6: The four moral appeal messages sent **during the first phase**

À TRAVERS NOTRE CONSOMMATION ÉNERGÉTIQUE
NOUS CONTRIBUONS AU RÉCHAUFFEMENT CLIMATIQUE.
2016, FONTE RECORD DE LA BANQUISE ARCTIQUE.
TOUS ACTEURS POUR CHANGER.

Translation :
Through our energy consumption
we contribute to global warming.
2016, record melting of arctic sea ice.
Be involved for change.

First week message

À TRAVERS NOTRE CONSOMMATION ÉNERGÉTIQUE
NOUS CONTRIBUONS AU RÉCHAUFFEMENT CLIMATIQUE.
UNE PERSONNE DÉMÉNAGE CHAQUE SECONDE
POUR DES RAISONS CLIMATIQUES.
TOUS ACTEURS POUR CHANGER.

Translation :
Through our energy consumption
we contribute to global warming.
One person moves every second
for climatic reasons.
Be involved for change.

Second week message

À TRAVERS NOTRE CONSOMMATION ÉNERGÉTIQUE
NOUS CONTRIBUONS AU RÉCHAUFFEMENT CLIMATIQUE.
LES OCÉANS VERRONT « LEUR ACIDITÉ AUGMENTER D'ENVIRON 170 %
PAR RAPPORT AUX NIVEAUX PRÉINDUSTRIELS D'ICI À 2100 ».
GRANDS RÉCIFS CORALLIENS MENACÉS !
TOUS ACTEURS POUR CHANGER.

Translation :
Through our energy consumption
we contribute to global warming.
The oceans will see "their acidity increase by about 170% compared to
pre-industrial levels by 2100"
Great coral reefs under threat!
Be involved for change.

Third week message

A TRAVERS NOTRE CONSOMMATION ÉNERGÉTIQUE
NOUS CONTRIBUONS AU RÉCHAUFFEMENT CLIMATIQUE
ENTRE 2030 ET 2050,
ON S'ATTEND À CE QUE LE CHANGEMENT CLIMATIQUE
ENTRAÎNE PRÈS DE 250 000 DÉCÈS SUPPLÉMENTAIRES PAR AN.
TOUS ACTEURS POUR CHANGER.

Translation :
Through our energy consumption
we contribute to global warming.
Between 2030 and 2050,
it is expected that climate change
will cause more than 250,000 additional deaths per year.
Be involved for change.

Fourth week message

B.2. Moral Appeal + Stickers

Figure 7: Four second step moral appeal messages sent

A TRAVERS NOTRE CONSOMMATION ÉNERGÉTIQUE
NOUS CONTRIBUONS AU RÉCHAUFFEMENT CLIMATIQUE.
AU MENU DU RÉCHAUFFEMENT CLIMATIQUE :
DIMINUTION DE LA PLUVIOMÉTRIE DANS LES RÉGIONS LES PLUS ARIDES
ET ACCROISSEMENT DES PRÉCIPITATIONS DANS LES RÉGIONS LES PLUS ARROSÉES.
TOUS ACTEURS POUR CHANGER.

Translation :
Through our energy consumption
we contribute to global warming.
On the cards for global warming:
decrease in rainfall in the most arid regions
and increase of precipitation in the most watered regions.
Be involved for change.

Fifth week message

À TRAVERS NOTRE CONSOMMATION ÉNERGÉTIQUE
NOUS CONTRIBUONS AU RÉCHAUFFEMENT CLIMATIQUE.
MONTÉE DES OCÉANS :
LE RYTHME S'ACCÉLÈRE DANGEREUSEMENT.
TOUS ACTEURS POUR CHANGER.

Translation :
Through our energy consumption
we contribute to global warming.
Rise of the oceans:
The pace is accelerating dangerously.
Be involved for change.

Sixth week message

A TRAVERS NOTRE CONSOMMATION ÉNERGÉTIQUE
NOUS CONTRIBUONS AU RÉCHAUFFEMENT CLIMATIQUE.
LE CHANGEMENT CLIMATIQUE MENACE
LA SÉCURITÉ ALIMENTAIRE MONDIALE.
TOUS ACTEURS POUR CHANGER.

Translation :
Through our energy consumption
we contribute to global warming.
Climate change threatens
World Food Security.
Be involved for change.

Seventh week message

A TRAVERS NOTRE CONSOMMATION ÉNERGÉTIQUE
NOUS CONTRIBUONS AU RÉCHAUFFEMENT CLIMATIQUE.
LE CHANGEMENT CLIMATIQUE EN COURS
POURRAIENT ENTRAÎNER L'EXTINCTION
D'UN SIXIÈME DES ESPÈCES ANIMALES.
TOUS ACTEURS POUR CHANGER.

Translation :
Through our energy consumption
we contribute to global warming.
Ongoing climate change
could cause the extinction of
a sixth of animal species.
Be involved for change.

Eighth week message

B.3. Social comparison

Figure 8: Four example of social comparison message



Translation :
Last week, you were the most energy efficient of the sites participating in our experiment.
You are therefore ranked first this week.
Excellent.

Very positive message



Translation :

Last week, you consumed less than 62.5% of the participating sites in our experiment
You get three stars this week.
Can you do better?

Positive message



Translation :
Last week, you consumed more than 56.25% of the participating sites in our experiment
You get two stars this week.
You can do better!

Negative message



Translation :
Last week, you consumed more than 87.5% of the participating sites in our experiment.

You only get one star this week. See the positive side, you have the

most flexibility.

Very negative message

B.4. Stickers

Figure 9: The twelve stickers



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Appendix C

C.1. Ex-ante surveys responses

Question

Do you think it is important to control our energy consumption because it is an important part of environmentally friendly behavior? Not at all (0.35%) - Rather (14.58%) - Absolutely (85.07%)

Do you think your effort in energy efficiency meets individual responsibility towards society? 92.71%

Overall, do you pay attention to your energy consumption? At home (95.83%) - At work (89.24%)

At home, your heating consumption is? Individual (10.07%) - Included in collective charges (89.93%)

How often do you perform the following actions in your daily life? (%)

	Never	Occasionally	Often	All the time
Turn off the lights when leaving a room:	0.69	2.78	25.69	70.83
Lower the heating / air conditioning to limit your energy consumption:	4.17	18.06	40.97	36.81
Use the washing machine or dishwasher only at full load:	3.47	10.07	32.99	53.47
Use the sleep mode of appliances / electronics (computer, printer):	31.94	27.43	20.14	20.49
Dry clothes outdoors instead of in a dryer:	4.86	10.42	9.79	64.93

At home, in the past five years, have you installed any of the following (%)

	Yes	Already equipped	No	Unrealizable or Owner job
Energy-efficient appliances of the highest class:	59.38	23.26	15.28	2.08
Low-energy bulbs:	71.18	14.58	13.89	0.35
Energy efficient windows:	33.68	44.83	13.54	6.94
Thermal insulation of walls / roof:	23.26	34.03	29.17	13.54
Heat Thermostats:	21.53	28.82	37.50	12.15
Solar panels for electricity or hot water:	4.51	3.47	68.06	23.96

Do you think that your potential efforts to control energy consumption in companies have an impact on your remuneration? 26.04 %

Do the following factors encourage you to reduce your energy use in your professional activity? (scale 0 to 10)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
More information on practices to reduce your energy consumption at work (%):	9.03	2.08	3.82	2.08	17.01	8.68	12.85	23.26	7.64	13.54
More information on the impact of energy consumption on the environment (%):	8.33	2.08	4.51	3.12	14.93	5.21	12.15	21.53	12.5	15.62
More information on your individual energy consumption at work (%):	7.99	0.35	2.08	1.04	13.89	4.86	11.81	25.69	15.28	17.01
An increase in your earnings according to your company's energy savings (%):	6.6	1.39	1.74	1.74	9.03	3.12	5.9	14.93	8.33	47.22
Information about your company's energy consumption compared to other comparable companies (%):	8.33	2.78	2.08	1.74	14.93	5.56	15.28	19.79	13.19	16.32
Discover that your company consumes more energy than other similar companies (%):	10.42	3.82	2.43	1.04	14.58	3.82	12.85	20.49	12.15	18.40
An increase in the price of energy (%):	16.67	4.17	2.08	1.39	22.57	6.25	10.07	14.93	6.94	14.9

In company, do you control your energy consumption because
Your company has a pro-environmental commitment?: 63.89%
This seems important to your company's profitability?: 71.88%
You have a pro-environmental commitment?: 71.18%
Age (%)
18–24 years old: 4.86 / 25–34 years old: 20.83 / 35–49 years old: 35.76 / 50–64 years old: 38.19 / 65 and over: 0.35
Education (%)
Without diploma: 0.69 / 2 year degree after high school: 28.47 / Professional training (CAP, BEP, BP, etc.): 4.51
Bachelor's degree: 27.43 / High school degree: 6.25 / Master's degree or higher: 32.64

C.2. Ex-post surveys responses moral appeal treatment (MAT), social comparison treatment (SCT) and stickers treatment (ST)

Question	MAT	SCT	ST
Have you received emails encouraging your colleagues and yourself to adopt an environmentally friendly behavior by reducing your energy consumption? (% yes)	93.65	82.69	——
On a scale of 1 (not at all intrusive) to 10 (very intrusive), how did you perceive these emails?			
1 (not at all intrusive)	32.20	18.60	——
2	10.17	13.95	——
3	10.17	9.30	——
4	1.69	13.95	——
5	18.64	18.60	——
6	10.17	6.98	——
7	8.47	6.98	——
8	3.39	4.65	——
9	1.69	6.98	——
10 (very intrusive)	3.39	0	——
Have you read the emails? (% yes)	84.74	97.67	——
Did you click on the links? (% yes)	60.00	——	——
Do you think that these emails have affected your energy consumption? (% yes)	28.57	36.54	——
Do you think that these emails have affected the behavior of your colleagues? (% yes)	36.51	26.92	——
Have changes in the behavior of your colleagues affected your own behavior? (% yes)	34.78	42.86	——
Have you talked about these emails with your colleagues?(% yes)	39.68	32.69	——
If yes, has the change in behavior of your colleagues affected your own behavior?(% yes)	40.82	43.85	——
Was the content of these emails the subject of your company's external communication? (% yes)	23.81	3.85	——
Have you even communicated the content of these emails to people outside of the company? (% yes)	6.35	1.92	——
Your preference in terms of comfort temperature at work:			
A temperature above 24 degrees	3.17	5.77	47.92
A temperature between 22 and 24 degrees	53.97	61.54	47.92
A temperature below 22 degrees	38.10	32.69	0
It does not matter	4.76	0	4.17
When you feel cold, do you prefer			
To increase the temperature?	34.92	46.15	41.67
To dress more warmly?	52.38	48.08	50.00
To drink a hot drink?	12.70	5.77	83.33
Have you noticed the stickers encouraging you and your colleagues to behave in an environmentally friendly way by reducing your energy consumption? (% yes)	74.60	53.84	89.59
On a scale of 1 (not at all intrusive) to 10 (very intrusive), how did you perceive these stickers?			
1 (not at all intrusive)	40.42	21.43	18.60
2	8.51	21.43	16.28
3	8.51	3.57	4.65
4	0	7.14	2.32
5	21.28	28.57	32.56
6	8.51	7.14	4.65
7	4.26	0	6.98
8	4.25	7.14	9.30
9	2.13	3.57	0
10 (very intrusive)	2.13	0	4.65
Do you think these stickers have affected your energy consumption? (% yes)	47.12	32.14	16.28
In your opinion, did these stickers affect the behavior of your colleagues? (% yes)	31.75	32.14	16.28
If yes, have changes in behavior of your colleagues affected your own behavior? (% yes)	30.00	13.46	25.00
Have you talked about these stickers with your colleagues? (% yes)	49.21	43.72	68.75
If yes, Have the changes in behavior of your colleagues affected your own behavior? (% yes)	40.16	23.08	21.21
Age			
18-24 years old :	7.94	5.77	12.50
25–34 years old :	20.63	28.85	31.25
35–49 years old :	44.44	34.62	43.75
50–64 years old :	26.98	30.77	12.50

Appendix D : Robustness check regression

Table 11: Difference-in-difference estimation results by treatment with company-fixed effects.

	Moral Appeal (MAT)		**Social comparison (SCT)**		**Stickers (ST)**	
	Electricity consumption	Heating consumption	Electricity consumption	Heating consumption	Electricity consumption	Heating consumption
Companies treated	230.1***	11.313***	126.284***	-61.390***	74.946***	-18.977***
First treatment period (29–56 days)	-11.953***	-11.411***	-12.961***	-12.767***	-15.506***	-13.204***
Second treatment period (57–84 days)	-14.091*	-14.443***	-16.469***	-17.642***	-22.473***	-18.672***
First treatment period * Companies treated	-7.278	-7.923	-3.769	3.493	3.530	1.125
Second treatment period * Companies treated	-44.660***	-20.495***	-20.631***	-7.358*	2.793	0.560
Days Worked	36.341***	16.618***	37.415***	9.373***	40.030***	22.057***
Weather temperature	-4.934***	-4.062***	-4.383***	-3.322***	-2.994***	-3.083***
company-fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	112.596***	116.955***	105.641***	113.811***	88.159***	102.069***
R-Squared	0.9200	0.8420	0.9143	0.7331	0.8260	0.6834
N	2016	1764	2100	1764	2016	1764

$*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001$. Robusted standard errors around companies

Table 12: Diff-in-diff estimation results for all treatment with company-fixed effects.

	Electricity consumption	Heating consumption
First treatment period (29–56 days)	-7.716	-6.557**
Second treatment period (57–84 days)	-6.537	-7.619**
Companies treated by Moral appeal	-44.068***	254.799***
Companies treated by Social Comparison	448.624***	-38.759***
Companies treated by Stickers	80.972***	-15.334**
First treatment period * Companies treated by Moral appeal	2.082	-4.771
Second treatment period * Companies treated by Moral appeal	-35.520***	-17.302***
First treatment period * Companies treated by Social Comparison	-0.204	3.973
Second treatment period * Companies treated by Social Comparison	-17.840**	-7.253*
First treatment period * Companies treated by Stickers	2.688	-0.002
Second treatment period * Companies treated by Stickers	0.117	-1.440
Days Worked	45.283***	21.848***
Weather temperature	-6.267***	-4.854***
Company-fixed effects	YES	YES
Constant	119.881***	119.330***
R-squared	0.9140	0.8046
N	4277	3367

$*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001$. Robusted standard errors around companies.

Appendix E



Figure 10: Mean daily Electricity (per employees) and Heating (per m2) consumption

Appendix F

We present the following equation for the difference-in-difference estimation by week

$$
\begin{aligned}
Y_{it} = {} & \beta_1 T_{it} \\
& + \beta_2 W5_{it} + \beta_3 W5_{it} T_{it} + \beta_4 W6_{it} + \beta_5 W6_{it} T_{it} \\
& + \beta_6 W7_{it} + \beta_7 W7_{it} T_{it} + \beta_8 W8_{it} + \beta_9 W8_{it} T_{it} \\
& + \beta_{10} W9_{it} + \beta_{11} W9_{it} T_{it} + \beta_{12} W10_{it} + \beta_{13} W10_{it} T_{it} \\
& + \beta_{14} W11_{it} + \beta_{15} W11_{it} T_{it} + \beta_{16} W12_{it} + \beta_{17} W12_{it} T_{it} \\
& + \beta_{18} DaysWorked + \beta_{19} WeatherTemperature \\
& + \beta_{20} CompanySize + \beta_{21} NbEmployees + \beta_{22} AgencyOpenPublic + \beta_0 + \epsilon_{it}
\end{aligned}
\tag{2}
$$

Where, Y_{it} is the outcome variable of interest, i.e. the average daily energy consumption for company i at time t. T_{it} equals 1 if company i belongs to the group of companies treated (and 0 otherwise), and thus, β_1 captures the differences between the companies treated and those of the comparison group before the treatment. $W5_{it}$ ($W6_{it}, W7_{it}, W8_{it}, W9_{it}, W10_{it}, W11_{it}, W12_{it}$) equals 1 in the first (second, third,..., eighth) week treatment period. Therefore, $\beta_2, \beta_3, \beta_4, \beta_5, \beta_6, \beta_7, \beta_8, \beta_9$ captures aggregated factors that would cause changes in energy use in the absence of treatment. The interaction terms $\beta_{10}, \beta_{11}, \beta_{12}, \beta_{13}, \beta_{14}, \beta_{15}, \beta_{16}, \beta_{17}$ are the coefficients of interest for the first, second, ..., eighth week treatment period and equals 1 for companies treated by the nudge after the intervention (and 0 otherwise). This represents the causal effect of treatment, i.e. the impact of the nudge on energy consumption. The interaction terms are the coefficients that are represented in Figure 5.

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